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Abstract: Since Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems started to be widely used, several vulnerabilities in their proto-
cols have been found. Attacks such as jamming-and-replay attacks and relay attacks are still effective against
most recent RKE systems (Ibrahim et al., 2018), even when many secure schemes have been designed. Al-
though they are interesting from a theoretical point of view, the complexity of these solutions is excessive to
implement them into a fob (Karani et al., 2016). This paper presents a lightweight and general solution based
on a one message protocol, which guarantees the integrity and validity of the authentication in RKE sys-
tems, protecting the communication against the well-known jamming-and-replay and relay attacks, without
using complex cryptographic schemes. Moreover, we also adapt our protocol for passive RKE (PRKE) sys-
tems. Our solution also includes a novel frequency-hopping-based approach which mitigates deny-of-service
attacks. Finally, a prototype has been implemented using non-expensive hardware. Obtained results assure
scalability, effectiveness and robustness.
1 INTRODUCTION
The usage of RKE systems has been increasing over
the years, being them widely used to remotely lock
and unlock cars, garage doors, sensors, doorbells or
alarms. The first RKE systems used a simple pro-
tocol, where a code was sent in plaintext to a re-
ceiver which had to execute a command, let us say,
unlock a door. However, as sniffing and replaying
the code was enough to be able to unlock such a
door, a new scheme called rolling codes was devel-
oped, and it is still widely used nowadays. Such
scheme pretends to be secure so the key fob com-
putes and sends a new code each time it is used,
and each code is accepted by the receiver just once.
Even so, it has been proved that rolling codes are
vulnerable to different attacks, and authorities are
starting to report1 criminals taking profit of these
vulnerabilities. This fact has led researchers to de-
sign new secure schemes (Lv and Xu, 2012) to pro-
tect these systems, but their complexity made man-
∗This is an extended version of a paper by the authors pub-
lished in Proceedings of SECRYPT 2019.
1https://www.west-midlands.police.uk/news/watch-police-
release-footage-relay-crime
ufacturers not to implement them, so it would mean
to develop key fobs with some disadvantages, i.e. a
higher price or a faster draining of the battery. This
is due to the fact that many solutions proposed to use
cryptographic schemes (Ni et al., 2007) which needed
higher computing power than the available in the cur-
rent fobs. Furthermore, the proposed protocols usu-
ally need more than one message to exchange some
private information or instruction command. For ex-
ample, some solutions (Glocker et al., 2017) require
to use a 4-way handshake before sending an instruc-
tion command, which increases the complexity of the
protocol.
Contributions. We provide a secure protocol2 to
be implemented by manufacturers into both RKE and
PRKE systems. Our scheme is robust against both
jamming-and-replay attacks and relay attacks; fur-
thermore, it mitigates the effectiveness of jamming-
based deny-of-service attacks, thanks to the integra-
tion into the protocol of a frequency-hopping ap-
proach. Moreover, our solution is a one message pro-
tocol for RKE systems and a two messages protocol
2The presented solution has been submitted as an invention
to be patented with European Patent application number
19382339.0, on May 6th, 2019.
for PRKE systems, where both approaches use a hash
function proved to have low CPU resources consump-
tion. As such, our solution is lightweight, scalable and
easy-to-implement. The purpose of this solution is to
be applied into key fobs with the only requirement of
having a real-time clock, synchronized periodically as
detailed in our protocol. We also demonstrate how our
solution can be implemented achieving good results.
Paper organization. This paper is structured as
follows: In Section 2 we explain both RKE and PRKE
systems along with the common attacks that can be
performed against them. In Section 3 the state-of-the-
art is presented. In Section 4 we explain our solution.
The implementation of the proposed solution is de-
scribed in Section 5. The experiments and the results
derived from them are explained in Section 6. We fi-
nally conclude in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section we first explain both RKE and PRKE
systems, as well as the main protocols that are cur-
rently used. Later, we explain the main attacks that
are currently effective against them.
2.1 Remote Keyless Entry systems
We call RKE to those systems which are composed of
a fob F and a deviceD. When a button on F is pressed,
a radio frequency signal is sent to D, including an in-
struction command thatD will have to execute. These
systems are commonly used to lock or unlock cars and
open their boots, to open a garage door, to control a
temperature sensor, etc. The main protocols used by
these systems can be divided as follows:
• Fixed codes. This is the simplest scheme. As de-
picted in Figure 1a, F sends a command cmd to
D, which is essentially a bit stream referring to an
action that D will have to perform.
• Rolling codes. There is a wide variety of rolling
codes algorithms, but all of them rely on the idea
of sending different codes each time a button of
F is pressed. In order to accomplish this pur-
pose, both F and D have previously agreed on
a secret key from which derives a sequence of
codes N1,N2, ...,Np. Then, as depicted in Figure
1b, each time a button on F is pressed, the next
code c is computed and sent to D, who checks
if the received number is equal to a value c that
previously it also computed. Apart from c, a
command cmd is also sent, which is typically a
sequence of bits that refers to an action D will
have to do, i.e. unlock a car. Each value c can
be used only once. In case D may have not re-
ceived some of the codes sent by F, it commonly
checks up to the next 256 generated codes, and
when a correct value c is received by D, all the
codes behind it cannot be used again. One of the
most used rolling codes devices has been KeeLoq
(Microchip Technology Inc., 1996).
2.2 Passive Remote Keyless Entry
systems
Passive Remote Keyless Entry (PRKE) systems
(King, 1998) are a special type of RKE. PRKE
systems do not require the user to manipulate F.
Instead, as soon as D receives an external input
(i.e. if D is a door, someone pulling the han-
dle), it automatically sends a request to F, which
replies with a confirmation. The most used proto-
col (NXP Semiconductors N.V., 2012) for PRKE sys-
tems is the challenge-response protocol:
Protocol 2.1 (Challenge-response protocol for
PRKE). Both D and F perform the following
2-message handshake:
1. First, D computes a random value r (the chal-
lenge), and sends it to F.
2. F encrypts r using a pre-shared symmetric-key sk,
and sends the encrypted value c to D.
3. D decrypts c using the same key sk and verifies the
identity of F .
For example, if D is a car using a challenge-
response protocol, when the user carrying F pulls the
car handle, D sends a message with a challenge r, and
as soon as F receives it, it replies with its answer. This
is depicted in Figure 1c.
2.3 Attacks against RKE and PRKE
Jamming-and-replay attack. As depicted in Figure
2, these attacks (Kamkar, 2015) are performed using
two transceiver devices. One of them is placed near
to D, hidden from the view of the victim V, and jam-
ming the frequency used by the system an attacker A
is willing to hack. Then, the other one is close to F,
eavesdropping the communications. When V presses
the button of F, the signal it sends is jammed by the
jamming transceiver J, and V is forced to use an al-
ternative (i.e. a physical key). Meanwhile, A captures
the message sent by F, and as D never receives it, A
will be able to replay it later. Finally, the jammer can
be remotely deactivated by A, as soon as he is sure
that V will not try to use F again.
(a) Fixed codes protocol (b) Rolling codes protocol (c) Challenge-response protocol
Figure 1: Main RKE and PRKE protocols
Figure 2: Jamming-and-replay attack
Relay attack. As it can be seen in Figure 3, this
kind of attacks (Francillon et al., 2010) are performed
using two transceivers connected through an LTE net-
work or similar. One of them is close to D, and the
other one to F. Like this, they create a bridge be-
tween both endpoints. If the attacked system is a
PRKE, when the attacker A2 pulls the car handle the
challenge-response protocol is performed through the
bridge created by both attackers. Otherwise, if we are
talking about an RKE system, we have to expect that
the user may either accidentally press the button on
F, or leave it unattended (thus allowing the attacker
A1 to press the button).
Figure 3: Relay attack
Deny-of-service (DoS) attack. This kind of at-
tack (Thakur and Sankaralingam, 2013) is also based
on jamming the frequency used by the protocol, but
in this case with the main goal of denying the service.
It has a lower impact on the system security as it does
not grant access to the system, but it bothers the user,
who will require a physical key if he wants to perform
the action.
3 RELATED WORK
Regarding the attacks against RKE systems, an im-
portant contribution on the topic has been recently
done in (Ibrahim et al., 2018). They demonstrate as
the jamming-and-relay attacks are nowadays still ef-
fective against a wide variety of modern cars, by mak-
ing use of two units of a radio frequency device called
HackRF One3, one for jamming and the other one for
logging data and replaying later.
A particular RKE scheme based on rolling codes,
and widely used by many manufacturers, is called
Hitag2 (Philips Semiconductors, 1998). An impor-
tant contribution related to this type of RKE has been
done in (Garcia and Oswald, 2016), where a novel
correlation-based attack is presented. This attack al-
lows an attacker to recover the secret key used in
Hitag2 systems, just by eavesdropping at least four of
the codes sent by the fob. Thus, it allows the attacker
to clone the fob. As stated in the paper, major manu-
facturers have sold systems with this vulnerability for
over 20 years. As such, the need for new secure and
easy-to-implement schemes becomes clear.
Implementation of the attacks. By making use
of two radio frequency devices called Yardstick One4
(YS1), a jamming-and-replay attack can be performed
by using a python implementation5 of this attack.
This implementation makes use of a library called
rflib, included in a software used by YS1 called Rf-
Cat6. That said, one antenna will be jamming while
the other will be sniffing the code of the fob. The
same implementation is useful for performing just the
DoS attack. Moreover, taking this implementation as
a starting point, implementing a relay attack is trivial.
3https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/
4https://greatscottgadgets.com/yardstickone/
5https://github.com/exploitagency/rfcat-rolljam
6https://github.com/atlas0fd00m/rfcat
Proposed solutions. Many secure schemes
(Lv and Xu, 2012), (Glocker et al., 2017) have been
designed to increase the security of RKE and PRKE
systems. The main problem they present is their
complexity, so they use cryptographic schemes which
are hard to implement into cheap key fobs. On
the other hand, some schemes (Jeong and So, 2018)
have been proved to be both simple and effective
against relay attacks. One of them, proposed in
(Ranganathan and Capkun, 2018), demonstrates that
a protocol calculating the time between message ex-
changes can determine if a relay attack is being per-
formed against a PRKE or not. This is the main idea
behind LASER, which also solves the replay vulnera-
bility.
4 OUR SCHEME: LASER
In this section we explain step-by-step our protocol,
LASER, for both RKE and PRKE systems. We con-
sider a fob F and a generic device D, assuming it to
be a car. First, both endpoints have to agree on a ran-
domly generated secret key sk large enough to make a
brute-force attack hard to accomplish (i.e. a 256-bits
key). They also need to agree on a set of commands
cmd, used for example to lock the car, unlock it, etc. D
also has a car identification number (deviceid) known
by F.
In both RKE and PRKE systems, both F and D
will be required to compute a hash. The hash function
used by both devices was required to be lightweight in
order to optimize the timings and the resources con-
sumption. For our implementation and analysis we
have chosen to use Blake2, a hash function proposed
in (Aumasson et al., 2013), which guarantees a low
power and computing resources consumption. Fur-
thermore, it is proved to be as fast asMD5, but solving
the security vulnerabilitiesMD5 presents.
In particular we are interested in using Blake2s,
a version of Blake2 optimized for 8-bit platforms,
which are the kind of cheap processors commonly
used for key fobs. Basing our solution in the usage
of a hash function like Blake2 instead of using some
complex cryptographic scheme, we are decreasing the
costs of implementing our solution, and also avoiding
a fast draining of the battery.
Our solution performs a frequency-hoppingproto-
col where the frequency channel used to transmit the
messages changes each period of time p. This means
that both D and F must agree on the same channel,
and to achieve it they perform the Protocol 4.1.
Protocol 4.1 (Frequency-hopping for LASER). The
frequency-hopping for a specific endpoint, which has
a number of available frequency channels Nc, is per-
formed as follows:
1. Each period of time p (both F and D have pre-
viously agreed on this value) it gets the current
datetime in a timestamp form, sums the secret key
sk to it and calculates its hash h.
2. It calculates the channel ch, which is the modulo
Nc of the integer representation of h: ch ≡ int(h)
(mod Nc).
Next subsections explain the specific details for
either RKE and PRKE systems.
4.1 LASER for RKE
In this subsection we first explain all the steps of the
RKE protocol in detail, and later the main approach
used to prevent each kind of attack.
4.1.1 LASER for RKE: protocol details
In this scheme, D is required to be always listening
to a specific channel, so it will be continuously per-
forming the Protocol 4.1. However, F will perform it
just before to start the Protocol 4.2. When the owner
of D wants to execute a command cmd by pressing
a button on F, F calculates ch by first calculating h,
but rounding the timestamp to the previous multiple
of p. Then, next protocol is performed (as depicted in
Figure 4):
Protocol 4.2 (LASER for RKE). Both D and F follow
the next protocol:
1. F takes the current timestamp tstart , sums it to sk
and computes its hash h.
2. F sends h over ch along with the real timestamp
tstart and the command cmd.
3. As soon as D receives the message sent in the
last step, it gets the current timestamp tend , and
checks if the difference between tstart and tend is
lower than or equal to a threshold γ, previously
estimated.
4. If the above condition is true, and h is correct, D
executes cmd.
An accurate time synchronization between F and
D is crucial, as F has to send an exact timestamp. To
overcome this drawback, we propose the usage of the
same approach we introduced in our protocol: if F
sends a timestamp tstart that does not verifies (tend −
tstart)≤ γ, D replies with a message hsync, tsync, where
tsync is the correct timestamp and hsync = Hash(sk+
tsync). F updates its real-time clock after verifying
hsync. The purpose of sending also a hash here, is to
avoid an attacker being able to send messages to F to
modify its current time.
Figure 4: LASER for RKE
4.1.2 LASER for RKE: security analysis
Preventing jamming-and-replay in RKE. To pre-
vent jamming-and-replay, our solution sends a unique
hashed value h of a string. Such string results of con-
catenating a secret key sk and the current timestamp
tstart at the moment the protocol is initiated. Like this,
each hash will be unique in time, and will be accepted
by the receiver just at that moment. Plus, the fact of
concatenating a secret key makes impossible for an
attacker A to generate a new hash.
Preventing relay attack in RKE. We first need
to estimate the threshold γ, which is the maximum
amount of time a message should take going from F
to D. In this scenario, if a message took an amount of
time (tend− tstart ) higher than γ, we could say that F is
placed further from D than what it should be, and that
the protocol is performed by means of a relay attack,
using an LTE network or similar.
Preventing DoS in RKE. Both endpoints have
a range of frequency channels Nc available to per-
form the frequency-hopping protocol, and the aim is
to agree on a channel ch without an attacker being
able of knowing it. The purpose is to change the trans-
mitting channel each short period of time p (let us say,
10 seconds), which should be defined by the manufac-
turer considering the best performance of the device.
By doing this, an attacker willing to perform a DoS
attack against us will have to jam a wide range of fre-
quencies at the same time. It can be done by means
of several jamming devices, which is an expensive in-
vestment7.
7https://www.jammer-store.com/hpj16-all-frequencies-
jammer.html
4.2 LASER for PRKE
In this subsection we first explain all the steps of the
PRKE protocol with detail, and later we introduce the
main approach used to prevent each kind of attack.
4.2.1 LASER for PRKE: protocol details
In this scheme, it will be F who is continuously per-
forming the Protocol 4.1. When the owner ofD wants
to unlock it by pulling the handle, D calculates ch by
first calculating h, but rounding the timestamp to the
previous multiple of p. Then, next protocol is per-
formed (as depicted in Figure 5):
Protocol 4.3 (LASER for PRKE). Both D and F fol-
low the next protocol:
1. D sends over ch a SYN message to F including
the deviceid . At the moment it sends the message,
it also starts to calculate a message exchanging
time te.
2. F computes the hash value of sk plus tp, and sends
the result h to D.
3. As soon as D receives the message sent in the last
step, it stops the counter of te. Like this, now
D knows a value te which is the time between D
sending a message and receiving a response. If
the received value h is correct and te is lower than
or equal to a threshold γ, D executes the desired
action.
Figure 5: LASER for PRKE
In PRKE, if D does not receive a response after
sending the first message of the protocol, it can be
that tp on F is incorrect. In this case, D must send
hsync, tsync using all the other frequencies, to be able
to reach the one used by F , and make it update its
current time.
4.2.2 LASER for PRKE: security analysis
Preventing jamming-and-replay in PRKE. To pre-
vent jamming-and-replay, in PRKE we also send a
unique hashed value h of a string. Although we also
compute h concatenating sk and a timestamp, in this
case the later is slightly different. For PRKE the pre-
vention against relay attacks is based on another ap-
proach we explain in next paragraph, and this is the
reason why we can use the timestamp tp calculated
during the frequency hopping protocol as the value
concatenated to sk. Like this, each h can be used
only during a short period of time p, thus preventing
jamming-and-replay.
Preventing relay attacks in PRKE. The value te
is the time it takes a message to go fromD to F, plus a
response message to go back to D. By placing F next
to D and pulling the handle of the car, we can calcu-
late an estimated value γ, which is the threshold the
protocol should never surpass. If a message took an
amount of time te higher than γ, we could say that F is
placed further from D than what it should be, and that
the protocol is performed by means of a relay attack.
As in this case is D who calculates te, F will not be
required to calculate the current timestamp tstart , thus
the protocol will be less time and power consuming
for it.
Preventing DoS in PRKE. For PRKE systems,
the prevention against DoS attacks works essentially
like in RKE systems.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Our solution has been implemented using the follow-
ing hardware:
• A PC with a CPU Intel Core i5 3210M and Kali
Linux installed, representing the device D.
• A PC with a CPU Intel Atom x7-z8750 and Kali
Linux installed, representing the fob F.
• Two units of YS1: one plugged in the PC rep-
resenting D and the other one plugged in the PC
representing F.
This prototype8 has been developed and tested
with both PCs having Python, RfCat and some other
dependencies installed. Next subsections explain the
details of this implementation for both RKE and
PRKE systems.
8https://github.com/xevisalle/laser
5.1 Implementation of LASER for RKE
Our code is composed of a single script, which can
be run either for F and D. Once it has been run in the
first PC (acting as D) providing a deviceid and a sk,
it starts performing the frequency-hopping protocol.
The range of frequencies used by the code can be pro-
vided by the user, where the available range depends
on the antenna used, in this case YS1. While per-
forming the frequency-hopping protocol, it also starts
to listen for incoming messages. In the case of F, the
script will remain waiting for a user input, which will
be the command to be executed.
Once we press the key corresponding to the com-
mand we want to execute, F will first perform the
frequency-hopping protocol to determine which fre-
quency has to use, and after this, it will perform the
LASER protocol. The message sent by F will be like
the one depicted in Figure 6, where start and end are
4 always identical bytes placed at the beginning and
at the end of the message, to make it easier for the re-
ceiver to catch it. Furthermore, the protocol keeps be-
ing performed while the user retains the key pressed,
meaning this that messages are sent continuously till
the key is released. Even pressing and releasing the
key quickly, our tests demonstrate that around 6 mes-
sages are sent on average. This has been done on pur-
pose, like is done in regular RKE systems, to avoid
having to press more than once if the receiver is not
able to catch the message the first time, due to random
hardware errors. Finally, once D receives and verifies
the message hash and the timestamps, it executes the
command.
start device id hash t start cmd end
4 bytes 4 bytes 6 bytes ∼ 20 bytes 2 bytes 4 bytes
Figure 6: LASER message for RKE
5.2 Implementation of LASER for
PRKE
We run the code like we did with the one for RKE.
In this case, D expects a user input which simulates,
for example, pulling the car handle. Once done, it
performs the frequency hopping protocol to know at
which frequency F is expecting to receive messages.
After this, it sends a message like the one depicted in
Figure 7, where hash is null. As it happens with the
implementation of LASER for RKE, D keeps sending
messages while is receiving the input from the user
(i.e. while the user is pulling the car handle), in order
to guarantee the performance of the protocol.
Once F (who was performing the frequency-
hopping protocol as well) receives the message from
start device id hash end
4 bytes 4 bytes 6 bytes 4 bytes
Figure 7: LASER message for PRKE
D, it replies with a new message, this time with the
hash field filled. D receives the message and after
verifying its hash and the timestamps, it executes the
specified command cmd.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we estimate the threshold γ, and then
we use it to analyze the robustness of both systems
against relay attacks.
6.1 Estimating the threshold
For each system RKE and PRKE we have tried to
execute a command one thousand times. The success
rate has been 100% in both cases, meaning this that
the command has been always executed. By logging
the timestamps into a dataset, we have found out that
the time it takes for a message to go from an endpoint
to the other one is never higher than tmax = 136 ms
for the RKE solution, as shown in Table 1. For PRKE
systems, where the calculated time is how much it
takes D to receive F’s reply, the maximum time it
took has been tmax = 175 ms.
Table 1: Information extracted from timestamps of RKE
and PRKE systems, expressed in milliseconds.
System tmax tmin tavg tQ3
RKE 136 55 71 79
PRKE 175 113 157 164
At this point, we could think on the possibility of
choosing the maximum value as the threshold. How-
ever, it could be dangerous if a relay attack is per-
formed: for the RKE system, if the message takes the
minimum time tmin = 55 ms to go to the attacker A1,
and the second attacker A2 gets to send the relayed
message in the same amount of time, it would take
110 ms. Assuming that the attackers will not be able
to exchange the relayed message through a LTE net-
work or similar in less than tmax− 110 = 26 ms is a
weak premise. To solve this, we could take the av-
erage amount of time, but then we are compromising
the usability of the system, so most of the time the
user will have to press the button more than once, as
shown in Figure 8. We can overcome this problem by
calculating the third quartile of the dataset, which is
higher than the average in both RKE and PRKE sys-
tems. We can see in Figure 8 that now the effectivity
is higher as well. As every time we press the button in
the fob we are sending around 6 messages, the prob-
ability of failing when trying to execute a command
is almost negligible, so the success rate for each mes-
sage is almost 75%.
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Figure 8: Success rate when trying to execute a command in
both RKE and PRKE systems considering different thresh-
olds.
6.2 Robustness against relay attacks
Let us have an RKE relay attack scenario as depicted
in Figure 9. If the minimum time it can ever take for
the user’s hardware to send a message from F to D is
tmin, we can be sure that tFA1 = tmin is the minimum
value that can be achieved. As such, our scheme is
secure as far as the attackers are not able to achieve
the following statement:
tFA1 + tA1A2 + tA2D ≤ γ
(tA1A2 + tA2D)≤ γ− tFA1
(tA1A2 + tA2D)≤ γ− tmin
(1)
Figure 9: RKE relay attack scenario.
On the other hand, we have a PRKE relay attack
scenario as depicted in Figure 10. If the minimum
time it can ever take for the user’s hardware to send a
message from D to F and send the answer back to D
is tmin, we can be sure that (tDA2 + tFA1) = tmin is the
minimum value that can be achieved. As such, our
scheme is secure as far as the attackers are not able to
achieve the following statement:
tDA2 + tA2A1 + tA1F + tFA1 + tA1A2 + tA2D ≤ γ
(tA2A1 + tA1F + tA1A2 + tA2D)≤ γ− (tDA2 + tFA1)
(tA2A1 + tA1F + tA1A2 + tA2D)≤ γ− tmin
(2)
Figure 10: PRKE relay attack scenario.
If we take as an example the results we got, the
attackers trying to hack LASER should achieve the
next statements to succeed, where γ = tQ3 = 79 ms
and tmin = 55 ms for RKE:
(tA1A2 + tA2D)≤ 24 ms (3)
And γ = tQ3 = 164 ms and tmin = 113 ms for
PRKE:
(tA2A1 + tA1F + tA1A2 + tA2D)≤ 51 ms (4)
As detailed in Section 2, the bridge between A1
and A2 can be done through an LTE network or sim-
ilar. Knowing that the average uplink latency in LTE
networks is 10.5 ms (Amjad et al., 2018), we could
assume two attackers getting lower values for tA1A2
and tA2A1 . Even so, assuming that a relay attack can
be successful against LASER is a strong premise.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced LASER, a
lightweight and secure scheme for both RKE and
PRKE systems. LASER solves the security is-
sues present into these systems, completely avoid-
ing jamming-and-replay and relay attacks without us-
ing complex cryptographic schemes. Furthermore, it
mitigates DoS attacks thanks to a simple frequency-
hopping protocol. LASER is easy-to-implement and
we demonstrated it by implementing a prototype us-
ing non-expensive hardware. Last but not least, we
proved the effectiveness and robustness of our solu-
tion through different experiments we performed.
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